
Short-sighted economic policy?
Property bubble burst?
Severe credit-crunch?
Erectile dysfunction?
If you are ticking all of the above boxes, (except maybe, ahem, the last one), then you’re probably in Ireland in 2008, or Sweden in 1992.
Sixteen years ago, Sweden was looking down the barrel of an insolvent gun. Its housing bubble had burst, resulting in a credit crunch and the serious threat of bank closures. Then, as now, Government stepped in to rescue the system, and the manner of Sweden’s intervention saved not only the banking system, but was done at a final cost to the taxpayer of between two and three per cent of GDP. Following extensive research, (i.e., I went to wikipedia), this is what Sweden did:-
* The government announced the state would guarantee all bank deposits and creditors of the nation’s 114 banks.
* It assumed bad bank debts, but banks had to write down losses and issue an ownership interest (common stock) to the government. Shareholders were typically wiped out, but bondholders were protected.
* It formed a new agency to supervise institutions that needed recapitalization, and another that sold off the assets, mainly real estate, that the banks held as collateral.
* When distressed assets were later sold, the profits flowed to taxpayers, and the government was able to recoup more money later by selling its shares in the companies in public offerings.
The key to Sweden’s success was that it got the banks to come clean with regard to its losses before recapitalization took place. Also, it pressed hard on shareholders. This from the New York Times:-
Then came the imperative to bleed shareholders first. Mr. Lundgren recalls a conversation with Peter Wallenberg, at the time chairman of SEB, Sweden’s largest bank. Mr. Wallenberg, the scion of the country’s most famous family and steward of large chunks of its economy, heard that there would be no sacred cows. The Wallenbergs turned around and arranged a recapitalization on their own, obviating the need for a bailout. SEB turned a profit the following year, 1993.
“For every krona we put into the bank, we wanted the same influence,” Mr. Lundgren said. “That ensured that we did not have to go into certain banks at all.”
By the end of the crisis, the Swedish government had seized a vast portion of the banking sector, and the agency had mostly fulfilled its hard-nosed mandate to drain share capital before injecting cash. When markets stabilized, the Swedish state then reaped the benefits by taking the banks public again.
Irish media commentators are trying to make out that Irish banks are not insolvent, that the problem is not liquidity, but that nobody in Europe and beyond will borrow to Irish banks.
This is absolute nonsense. The reason why nobody will touch Irish banks is because the Irish banking banking system has crippled itself with construction boom debts. It lent money to builders to build homes, and then lent money to people to buy homes. Part of the problem in the international banking system is that nobody knows where the toxic debts are, or how much, or how little, each is holding. But, take one look at the Irish system, and it’s quite clear where the bad debts are sitting: most notably, AIB and Bank of Ireland. The government’s response, that the Irish banking system is fundamentally sound, is fundamentally wrong. It’s laughable to hear Irish commentators talk about this rescue plan as a possible model for the European and international banking system. It’s even funnier to hear them say, “well why hasn’t anyone else thought of this? Aren’t we the clever dicks!”
In order to save the Swedish banking system, shareholders took a hit. The managers and CEOs of the banks made bad decisions, and the shareholders lost out. As Paul Krugman puts it:-
the problem is insufficient capital: you want to inject capital, but you don’t want it to be a windfall to existing stockholders — hence, take over and recapitalize the failing firms.

(Source: AIB Group website.)
In order to protect these shareholders, the public is to take a hit. The idea that the Irish banking system is fundamentally sound, and that shareholders’ interests (and their dividends) are to be protected with taxpayers’ money - which is all that this plan, (such as it is), achieves - flies full-square in the face of the reality of the situation.
Its entire purpose, in its present manifestation, is to protect shareholders’ interests. It is short-term in the extreme, and ultimately, it will fail.
(Note: just watching the oireachtas live stream [11.21pm] and Simon Coveney has just said that he does not believe in the nationalization of banks. It’s always the wrong decision, he says - a bit like voting Fine Gael, I suppose.)