GREAVES SUMMER SCHOOL, 2009: BRIAN HANLEY AND MICK RYAN
Sep 13th, 2009 by Conor McCabe
It’s been a busy week for Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, authors of Lost Revolution (reviewed here). The book launch was held on Thursday (reviewed here and here), while on Saturday the Desmond Greaves Summer School had a session entitled: “Remembering 1969: memory and history” at which Brian Hanley and Mick Ryan were speaker and chair respectively. I was at the Greaves School, flogging the DVD of series one of Looking Left (I managed to sell four: time to kick back and buy that farmhouse in Spain), and was in the packed room for Dr. Hanley’s paper. I took the liberty of taping the talk, including the discussion afterwards. I’ve converted each into mp3s and they are available below. For those who wish to download the file, just right-click and choose the appropriate option.
1. Introduction (3:49)
2. Brian Hanley (43:20)
3. Discussion highlights (22:48)
4. Roy Johnson, Mick Ryan, and Brian Hanley on the civil rights movement and the Republican movement (12:56)
4. Mick Ryan on the IRA, 1962-68 (7:36)
Discussion has contributions from Roy Johnston, Fergus Whelan, Seamus Rattigan, Mark Cahill (?), Mick Ryan, and Seán O’Hare.
Introduction: Remembering 1969: Play Now | Play in Popup Brian Hanley, Main Talk: Play Now | Play in Popup Discussion highlights: Play Now | Play in Popup Johnson, Hanley, Ryan: Play Now | Play in Popup Mick Ryan on IRA, 62-68: Play Now | Play in Popup
[…] I couldn’t make the Greaves school this weekend but, Conor on Dublin Opinion could, and here is the fruit of his endeavours. Check out the panelists and the recordings of them. Required […]
Thanks a lot for this Conor. Interesting stuff. I have to say I’m a bit baffled as to why the idea that Goulding had to say more militant stuff than he felt in order to try and forestall a split has not been raised more in the discussions in and of the book, and at this. It would be worth raising if only to dismiss it I’d have thought.
‘I have to say I’m a bit baffled as to why the idea that Goulding had to say more militant stuff than he felt in order to try and forestall a split has not been raised more in the discussions in and of the book, and at this.’
How do you know he didn’t feel militant? Did you know Goulding? Do you have any idea what we were told at various stages about plans for the future? Do you know what we believed about the ceasefire in ‘72? We were going to wait until the provies were sidelined, then come back with new and better gear and finish the job; ie. get the Brits out a unite a socialist republic. Cathal promised us lots of things. I liked and respected him.
I did know him yes. The point I was making is that the statements at the time are being used to say that he later misrepresented what he thought at the time. That is entirely possibly, and perhaps even likely. But it is also possible that under the pressure of a movement splitting apart and an incomplete education process he said things in order to try and keep people on board. I just find it curious that that possibility was not raised by anyone in the discussion around this, if only to dismiss it like I said above.
I think this shows what Brian Hanley and Scott Millar have both said: that their book is only the beginning of the research into the Officials and the Workers Party, that by providing the narrative guide, so to speak, it ‘ll be possible to enter into that history and tease it out more.
That’s a fair point Conor. They must be sitting on loads more stuff and hopefully more will come out in future.
I take your point G. But, it sort of depends which split in a way. In 69 I find it hard to believe that there was an end goal in sight or that demilitarisation was seriously considered by Goulding et al. The very fact that they ramped up activities in the 69 -72 period would seem to indicate otherwise (granted partially under the pressure of events, but even so). The 69-72 period could be regarded as an effort to define the parameters of what was possible, and various combinations seem to have been attempted, i.e. large military/political movement, use of military actions, etc, etc either in tandem or isolation. In 1972 (and say from the middle of that year) I think there’s a stronger case that more militant language was used in order to forestall another split… but even there it’s still necessary to consider that post-the OIRA ceasefire there was an incredible range of actions for a fairly prolonged period afterwards.
Yeah there’s a more than a couple of theses/doctorates in the Workers’ Party and the Officials, and Hanley/Millar have provided the skeletal framework at least.
I take your point WBS. What you are saying certainly seems possible. But if for the sake of argument we accept that in the mid to late 60s there was an expectation at the top of the movement that some form of military action would ultimately be necessary, that still doesn’t resolve the question of what constitutes ultimately. Swan quotes a leadership document from 1966 that envisages the IRA being transformed into a group of people trained and able to lead the military phase of the ultimate revolution. That’s a long way away from preparing for a new campaign in the north. It seems to me that that is how Roy Johnston, for example, saw things. Not everyone in the movement saw it that way, far from it, but we can make the case that this represents the vision Goulding was acting on in light of subsequent developments, and subsequent statements by him. You pay your money, you take your choice.
That’s true too, but of course military action continued without cessation throughout the late 60s and on into 69, so while there was no question that they didn’t envisage a rebooted Border Campaign, or indeed anything approaching what came later with PIRA, conversely there appears no reason to believe they were winding down the organisation on the military side. And while it’s true that post January 1970 there was a clearly reactive aspect, in so far as firstly they wanted to maintain preeminence as ‘the’ IRA and ‘the’ SF, the dynamic of maintaining and in some instances increasing the military side continued throughout 70, 71 and into 72. That’s quite a time. And even the bould Roy left in what was it 72 because he thought there was increasing militarism.
All that said it’s clear that some of Gouldings later statements were very much a sanitised view of not merely what happened, but arguably what he intended to happen - indeed I’d suspect he and others had no clear picture as to what shape SF or the IRA would take in the long run until 73 or perhaps even a bit later, and why in fairness to him would he? There appears to have been considerable experimentation during those years to see what worked and what didn’t.
I take your point, but I think your collapsing the effects of the outbreak of the Troubles with the planned strategy beforehand. 1969 pushed people into doing things they wouldn’t have otherwise I think.
So was the IRA engaging in direct or military action in support of strikes? Yes. But was that intended as the prelude to some greater military action? I doubt it. It does however fit in with the idea of the IRA acting as a special action group in support of left-wing struggles.
Didn’t Garland announce the revolutionary party in 1972? I doubt he, Goulding and the rest had that idea in the few months beforehand. The evidence points both ways I think.
Yes and no…
Absolutely there was no idea of the IRA becoming a military force operating on a mass scale (short of outright revolution), but on the other hand it does seem to me simply from the scale of what was actually happening pre-August 69 that there was an intent for it to do what you suggest, i.e. special action group… and perhaps more as those struggles intensified. I also think there was a sense, and you find this in the UI to an extent, that the situation was moving in but a single direction.
As regards the revolutionary party idea, well that surely was implicit from 66/68/69 so yes, of course, in that respect you’re correct. But the issue is what sort of revolutionary party and my take is that it was seen as something a lot more activist than anything we’ve seen prior to then or indeed seen since.
While I also agree that the outbreak of the troubles diverted energies (as we know DHAC effectively was deserted by the IRA because in fairness they had more immediate concerns) I simply don’t believe that in 1968 there was a plan for a 1974 style OSF let alone the later SFWP or WP. I don’t believe in 1971 or 2 there were plans for those outcomes (not least because, for example Garland for one was going along a route that would have taken them to a somewhat different destination). There’s no question in my mind that you’re right that the Troubles pushed them into a more aggressive and confrontational stance vis the British state again this is hardly surprising. They were after all the IRA. One element of their function was if read in a minimalist fashion - defence. That that phase lasted three years - or more given the activities post-ceasefire it seems hard to credit that Goulding et al - however much they resiled restrospectively - were willing to see how far they could go. I think ultimately, even if the ceasefire was called too early, they made the only possible choice given the circumstances at that point in time, however, it wasn’t for want of trying.
I don’t know that there was no plan for it; I think it probably was the strategic goal, at least for the majority of the leadership attached to Goulding. What might have been less clear was how they were ultimately going to get there given the dynamics of the situation before 1969 (trying to avoid a split) and after (violence, added to trying to avoid a split!).
And yet if we look at the personalities is that absolutely clear from 1967 say? It seems much more like an evolution with a diffuse notion of a ‘workers’ party or perhaps something closer to a Left Republican party with the details far from worked out. It sure doesn’t seem hugely strategic more like an aspiration but with many many different overlays of ideology and approach on top.
Thanks again Conor for posting all this up. From my reading of what was being said in public and in private prior to 1969 I would argue that the majority of those attached to Goulding had not the slightest intention of getting rid of the IRA or abandoning the use of force. I hope to write more on the August 1967 meeting, some of which I quoted at the Greaves school, and which I think throws some light on internal debate on these matters. As I noted on Saturday the current Workers Party’s view on the role of the IRA in 1969 is vastly different to that put across by the party in 1979 or 1989.
WBS, I doubt there were any plans for changing the name for example in 1967. I’d also agree that there was no absolutely clear masterplan given that this process had only begun a few years before, but I do think if you look at the like of the Goulding speech about the different types of fight there must be it is more than aspirational. The Dáil stuff was aspirational. I think the instructions for people to get involved in different types of activity and politics was a plan with an ultimate goal of a different type of, overwhelmingly political, movement. Which goes I think to Brian Hanley’s point. There is still the question of what type of force and when. The idea of having eventually to apply force at the point of revolution is different than another campaign in the north. I think it’s clear that people had a sense of the former, but I’m not sure if it is being suggested that this means the latter.
I think more analysis is needed of the 60s attempted politicisation than is available through Hanley and Swan. We were of course hampered by the crisis in European Marxism, and we did our best to decouple ourselves from it. There is currently the makings of a neo-Marxist environmentalist philosophy, based on the Marx-Liebig interactions in the 1850; Bellamy Foster in New York is promoting this, and it is relevant to the Green-Left transition process. I have tried to put my involvement in the Goulding politicisation attempt via my Century book (cf the Lilliput Press website). I welcome comments from those who have read it, and I will respond when I receive them with the URL of the e-version of the book, which goes a bit deeper.
RoyJ
There is an interesting contribution to this subject under debate in the current issue of Saothar 35, 2010, by Liam Cullinane called ” A Happy Blend” . Irish republicanism, political violence and social agitation , 1962 -69.
Indeed. A flawed work by an otherwise handsome and dashing young historian.
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